DeepAI Gave Me Everything I need to know about the Gaza-Israel war

Wix image - journalist In a war zone

As an outside observer I found myself lost in the conversation about Gaza and Israel. After digging through newspapers and online content. I couldn’t work out what was going on, why the war was happening or why it was causing controversy. So as I usually do, I hit AI to help out.

Three main questions

I wanted to answer three big questions that would enabled me to come to my own conclusions of the situation.

Why is the area so important? What does religion have to do with it? And Why is it controversial?

I asked Deep Search these questions, it took 10 minutes to build out the response showing me what it was doing along the way. Here is how it played out. I started with “Give me the background and everything I need to know to bring me up to speed on Israel Gaza Palestine region”. Deep search came back with some clarifying questions of which I responded with; “Start at the beginning and cover religion, politics and war. As and when they become relevant to the story”.

Off it went. Showing me what steps it was taking. Transcript:

“I'm gathering info on ancient history, Jewish and Palestinian identities, colonial impacts, key wars, and recent events, ensuring a comprehensive, up-to-date overview through 2025.”

“Searched for Israel Gaza war timeline January 2024 5 The timeline spans from 7 Oct 2023 to May 6, 2024, with various phases of invasion, ceasefires, and offensives in between.”

“OK, let me see. The "Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement" likely occurred on January 19, 2025, suggesting the war extended into 2025, contrary to earlier 2024 reports.”

“I'm noting sources like UN's history, Britannica, Al Jazeera's timeline, and Washington Institute's insights. Each one seems potentially valuable.”

It goes on to check viability of sources, question the content as accurate and remove issues earlier AI would have struggled with in contradicting data or hallucinations.

Further more its processing complex social theory along with gathering datapoints and records to build a thesis.

“I'm thinking about how the resurgence of Palestinian identity is shaping public consciousness and image reception.”

“I’m piecing together data on Palestinian casualties, with deaths climbing to 40,000 by late July 2024. This highlights the ongoing human tragedy amid the conflict. Q Searched for Oslo Accords 1993 summary”

It’s passing in emotion, we can all agree the number of casualty’s are horrendous.

“I'm analyzing the staggering casualty and displacement figures from the 2023-2024 Gaza conflict, estimating over 40,000 deaths and 90% of the population displaced, all while noting increasing violence in the West Bank since 2023.”

It’s providing the full context even external players in the regions history, helping me come to a fully informed conclusion

“I'm summarizing international actors involved, including the US, Soviet Union, UN, Arab states, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt.”

Even using Geo location to form context picking between maps and even looking for image resolution for accuracy.

“I'm considering a map of the region or a timeline illustration of Israel and Palestine's history, as per Al Jazeera's suggestion Read aljazeera.com”

The tech has blown my mind, but its not until you read the article the really matters, this is how journalism should be, factual, clear and impartial.

“I'm crafting a cohesive narrative, noting intifadas, Hamas's rise, Gaza Wars, recent conflicts, and humanitarian impacts in Gaza and the West Bank. This approach ensures clarity and relevance.”

Do you trust AI to help form your own conclusion?

I am blown away by how well deep search studies an article, and then cross references a clame with another article, building up a complete and critical anaylisis of the content, sharing references for clarity, it even when through a round of thought and cross referencing.

Here is the most important part, has it answered my questions. Can I make clear judgment on what until now has been a blurry and bloody war, it’s a long one so I’ve added a key so you can jump to sections you’re interested in reading.

Please note this is 100% AI generated and even though it has done a great deal of cross-referencing, contextual research and deep searching it can still get it wrong or present a bias.

Israel Gaza the full story

Historical Overview of the Israel–Gaza–Palestine Conflict

Ancient History and Religious Significance

The land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – roughly corresponding to modern Israel and the Palestinian territories – has a rich ancient history and deep religious significance for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . In biblical times, the region (often called the Holy Land) was home to the ancient Israelite kingdoms of Israel and Judah, with Jerusalem as the site of the Jewish First and Second Temples. For Jews, this is the Promised Land, hallowed as the place given by God to the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Early Christianity also took root here: Jesus of Nazareth preached in Galilee and Judea, was crucified and (Christians believe) resurrected in Jerusalem, making the city holy to Christians as well. In the 7th century, the Muslim Arab armies conquered the region; soon after, the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque were built on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount (known to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif), cementing Jerusalem’s status as the third holiest city in Islam . Thus, for over two millennia, this land has been revered by all three Abrahamic faiths and often contested – a spiritual center that has unfortunately seen much conflict.

Evolution of Jewish and Palestinian Identities

Jewish attachment to the land remained strong even after the majority of Jews were exiled by the Romans following the destruction of Jerusalem’s Second Temple in 70 CE. Through centuries of diaspora, Jewish communities preserved religious and cultural ties to Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel). In the late 19th century, in response to European anti-Semitism and inspired by nationalist currents, Zionism emerged – a movement calling for the return of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland and the establishment of a Jewish state . Pioneers began emigrating to Ottoman-ruled Palestine, joining the small existing Jewish community there and founding new agricultural settlements. Jewish identity increasingly took on a political dimension focused on nationhood in Palestine.

Meanwhile, the people of Palestine (predominantly Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians) underwent their own developing identity. Under Ottoman rule (1517–1917) and during the British Mandate (1917–1948), “Palestine” referred to the geographic region and all who lived in it. In fact, during the British Mandate period, “Palestinian” could refer to any resident of the territory, whether Arab or Jewish . (For example, The Jerusalem Post newspaper was founded in 1932 as the Palestine Post.) However, as Zionist immigration increased, the Arab inhabitants began to see themselves more distinctly as Palestinian Arabs, in opposition to the Zionist project. A modern Palestinian national identity coalesced in the early 20th century, sharpened by events like the 1936–1939 Arab revolt against British rule and Jewish immigration . After 1948, the term “Palestinian” became synonymous with the indigenous Arab population of the land (and their descendants) who did not become citizens of the new State of Israel . In short, by the mid-20th century there were two distinct nationalist identities tied to the same land – the Jewish national revival (Zionist) identity, and the Palestinian Arab national identity – setting the stage for conflict.

Ottoman Rule and the British Mandate (16th Century – 1947)

For centuries, the region was part of the multinational Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, Palestine was a relatively underdeveloped Ottoman backwater with a diverse population of Arabs (Muslim and Christian), a smaller Jewish minority, and others. Toward the end of Ottoman rule, the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine gained momentum among Zionists in Europe. World events then dramatically changed control of the area. During World War I, Britain conquered Palestine from the Ottomans, and in 1917 the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, pledging support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” . At the same time, Britain had also made vague promises to Arab leaders (e.g. the Hussein-McMahon correspondence) about Arab independence. After WWI, the newly-formed League of Nations granted Britain a Mandate over Palestine (effective 1922), with a dual obligation: to prepare the country for eventual self-governance and to implement the Balfour Declaration.

Jewish immigration to Mandatory Palestine increased, especially in the 1930s when Jews fled Nazi persecution in Europe. The Jewish population in Palestine rose from about 6% of the population in 1918 to roughly one-third of the population by 1947 . This demographic change alarmed the Arab majority. Communal tensions between Jews and Arabs intensified, erupting into periodic violence. Arabs resented both British colonial rule and the Zionist influx, leading to the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, a widespread uprising against British authority and land purchases by Jews . The British suppressed the revolt harshly. By the late 1930s, Britain realized its two promises (a Jewish national home and Arab self-determination) were on a collision course. A British commission in 1937 (Peel Commission) recommended partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, but that idea stalled. With World War II and the Holocaust, the urgency among Jews for a safe homeland grew even more acute . After WWII, tens of thousands of Jewish survivors sought entry to Palestine, but the British, facing Arab opposition, limited immigration. The situation grew untenable, with growing Jewish insurgency against British rule (groups like Irgun bombing British targets) and Arab-Jewish clashes. In February 1947 Britain announced it would end its mandate and turned the question of Palestine’s future over to the United Nations .

The 1947 UN Partition Plan and the 1948 Arab–Israeli War

Image: The United Nations’ 1947 Partition Plan (Resolution 181) proposed to divide British Mandatory Palestine into separate states – a Jewish state (shown in blue, ~55% of the land) and an Arab state (green, ~45%), with Jerusalem (yellow dot) placed under international administration . This plan was approved by the UN General Assembly in November 1947, with support from the United States, Soviet Union, and others, but was rejected by Arab leaders. Palestinian Arabs saw the plan as unfair – at that time Jews owned only ~7% of the land and comprised about one-third of the population, yet were allotted more than half of the territory. Jewish leaders (the Zionist Yeshuv) reluctantly accepted the partition as a step to statehood, while Arab representatives (and the Arab states) opposed it, asserting that it violated the rights of the Arab majority.

When the British Mandate expired on May 14, 1948, the Jewish leadership declared the independence of the State of Israel. The next day, war broke out as neighboring Arab countries – Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Syria, Iraq, and others – invaded the former Mandate territory, joining local Palestinian Arab fighters in a bid to prevent the establishment of Israel and to claim the territory for Arab Palestine . This 1948 Arab–Israeli War (called the War of Independence by Israelis, and al-Nakba or “Catastrophe” by Palestinians) was a tumultuous, multi-front conflict. Despite the odds, the newly formed Israel Defense Forces (out of pre-state militias like Haganah) prevailed, in part due to better organization and internal divisions on the Arab side. By the time armistice agreements were signed in 1949, Israel had expanded beyond the UN partition lines, controlling about 78% of historic Palestine (all of the territory except Gaza and the West Bank). The remaining 22% – the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip – came under the control of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. (Transjordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, and Egypt put Gaza under a military administration without annexation .)

One of the most profound outcomes of the 1948 war was the mass displacement of Palestinians. During the fighting, and in many cases due to deliberate expulsion or fear of massacres, roughly 750,000 Palestinian Arabs – about half the Arab population of the land – fled or were forced from their homes . They became refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring countries (Lebanon, Syria, and especially Jordan), never allowed by Israel to return to their towns and villages. This expulsion and exodus is what Palestinians term the Nakba. Hundreds of Palestinian villages were emptied and later destroyed. Those Palestinians who remained in the area that became Israel (about 150,000 people) became Israeli citizens, but lived for years under military law and faced land confiscations . The Palestinian refugee crisis has persisted through generations – today there are nearly 6 million registered Palestinian refugees, including descendants, living in the Middle East .

The 1949 armistice lines (often called the “Green Line”) left Israel with sovereign control of most of the land, while Jordan held the West Bank (including the Old City of Jerusalem) and Egypt held Gaza. Notably, no independent Palestinian Arab state emerged, despite the UN plan’s intent. The Gaza Strip became a crowded refuge for Palestinians (its population swelled by refugees from elsewhere in Palestine), and the West Bank, likewise full of refugees, was annexed by Jordan (a move recognized by only a few countries). Jerusalem was divided – Israel held the western part of the city and Jordan the eastern part, including the holy sites of the Old City. The 1948 war thus established the initial contours of the Arab–Israeli conflict: Israel had achieved statehood and security for Jewish refugees and nationals but at the cost of dispossessing Palestinian Arabs, creating a massive refugee population and an enduring grievance. This set the stage for further wars and conflict in the decades to come.

The 1967 Six-Day War and Its Consequences

In the two decades after 1948, tensions remained high. Occasional cross-border fedayeen raids by Palestinian fighters and reprisals by Israel, disputes over waterways, and the broader Arab–Israeli rivalry all paved the path to another war. In June 1967, a confluence of events led Israel to launch a preemptive attack against Egypt and Syria, sparking the Six-Day War. Egypt had massed troops in the Sinai Peninsula and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (an act Israel deemed a casus belli), and defense pacts were signed between Arab states. Israel struck first (June 5, 1967), decimating the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. By June 10, the war was over – and astonishingly, Israel had achieved a sweeping victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Image: Territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War. In just six days, Israel seized the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria . (Israel more than tripled the land under its control, though it later returned Sinai to Egypt under a peace deal.) These conquests brought all the remaining areas of historic Palestine under Israeli military occupation and also added large populations of Palestinians under Israeli rule. Shortly after the war, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, unifying the city under Israeli sovereignty – a move not recognized by the UN or most of the world . The 1967 war was a watershed: Israel had to govern over a million Palestinian residents of the newly occupied territories, and the conflict’s focus now shifted to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

The war also produced another wave of Palestinian displacement. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians fled or were driven from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 . Many of these were second-time refugees (families who had been displaced in 1948 and had resettled in the West Bank or Gaza, only to flee again to Jordan or elsewhere in 1967). The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242 in November 1967, which emphasized the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the conflict, and for all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries . This resolution introduced the formula of “land for peace” that would underpin all future peace efforts – though its ambiguous wording (“withdrawal from territories” versus “the territories”) led to endless debate.

In the Arab world, the shock of 1967 led to the famous “Three No’s” of Khartoum in August that year: Arab states agreed no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations – a stance that would gradually soften only in later years . Meanwhile, Israel began establishing settlements in the newly occupied lands, especially in the strategic highlands of the West Bank and Golan and rebuilding the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza now lived under Israeli military occupation, subject to Israeli military orders and without citizenship.

Thus, after 1967, the core of the conflict was no longer about the 1948 boundaries (most Arab states tacitly accepted Israel’s pre-1967 existence at least as a reality) but about the future of the territories occupied in 1967 and the fate of the Palestinian people there and in exile. For Palestinians, 1967 compounded the Nakba and placed millions under occupation; for Israelis, the victory removed the immediate existential threat and brought Jewish holy sites (like the Western Wall in Jerusalem) under Jewish control, but it began an era of governing another people by force. The post-1967 period also internationalized the issue further, as the Cold War powers got involved (the US increasingly supporting Israel; the Soviets arming Arab states and later some Palestinian factions). Crucially, the disastrous defeat of Arab armies in 1967 also convinced many Palestinians that they would have to rely on themselves to achieve their national aspirations, rather than on pan-Arab support.

The Rise of the PLO and Palestinian Nationalism (1960s–1980s)

After 1967, Palestinian nationalism entered a new phase. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been founded in 1964 under Arab League auspices (largely controlled by Egypt initially), but in the late 1960s it transformed into a truly independent Palestinian movement. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the guerrilla group Fatah, became chairman of the PLO in 1969, shifting its base to Jordan and later Lebanon . The PLO’s charter called for the “liberation of Palestine” through armed struggle and rejected the existence of Israel (viewing the territory of former Mandatory Palestine as an indivisible homeland) . Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, various Palestinian guerrilla factions – Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front (DFLP), and others – carried out attacks on Israeli targets. These ranged from cross-border raids and hijackings to high-profile international attacks (such as the PFLP’s airline hijackings and the Munich 1972 Olympics massacre by the PLO-affiliated Black September unit). The Palestinian fedayeen fighters became a symbol of the Palestinian resistance. However, their presence also destabilized host countries: in 1970, after clashes, Jordan expelled the PLO (Black September), leading the PLO to relocate to Lebanon. In Lebanon, the PLO established a quasi-state in the south, which eventually dragged that country into the conflict as well.

Israel responded to PLO attacks with military reprisals and covert operations. In 1978 and then a larger invasion in 1982, Israel Defense Forces invaded southern Lebanon to combat the PLO. The 1982 invasion (during Lebanon’s civil war) reached Beirut and forced the PLO leadership into exile in Tunis. While Israel succeeded in scattering the PLO’s conventional forces, Palestinian nationalism was far from crushed; it began to manifest back inside the occupied territories themselves. Importantly, alongside armed struggle, Palestinian leaders also pursued international diplomacy. In 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” and that same year Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, raising the profile of the Palestinian cause on the world stage.

During this period, the political goals of the main Palestinian movement gradually evolved. Facing the reality that Israel was firmly entrenched, pragmatists in the PLO began contemplating a two-state solution – establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel, rather than in place of it. This shift was hinted by resolutions in the late 1970s and finally formalized in 1988 when Arafat and the PLO (from exile in Algiers) proclaimed an independent State of Palestine and implicitly recognized the pre-1967 Green Line as its territory. By accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO effectively acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, marking a major turning point . However, more militant rejectionist factions (and external actors like Iran and certain Islamists) did not accept this compromise.

Meanwhile, Israel was dealing with its own internal debates: after 1967 some Israelis pushed for retaining the West Bank and Gaza for religious/historical reasons (Greater Israel ideology), establishing settlements. Others warned that ruling over a growing Palestinian population without rights would be untenable in the long run. These debates continue to shape Israeli politics.

The First Intifada and Hamas Emergence (1987–1993)

By the late 1980s, Palestinian frustration in the occupied territories boiled over. In December 1987, a spontaneous uprising known as the First Intifada (“shaking off” in Arabic) erupted in Gaza and quickly spread to the West Bank. It began with local protests, boycotts of Israeli goods, general strikes, and youths throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. This grassroots revolt was driven by Palestinians who had lived under 20 years of military occupation with no end in sight, amid worsening economic conditions and the expansion of Israeli settlements. The Intifada was characterized by civil disobedience and unarmed protest, although violence did occur (both against Israelis and alleged Palestinian collaborators). Israel responded with a heavy hand, deploying troops to quell demonstrations, and the then-defense minister’s “iron fist” policy led to mass arrests and some famously harsh tactics (“break their bones”). The uprising resulted in over a thousand Palestinian deaths and several hundred Israeli deaths or injuries over its several years, drawing global attention to the plight of ordinary Palestinians under occupation .

During the First Intifada, a new force in Palestinian politics rose to prominence: Hamas. Founded in 1987 in Gaza at the beginning of the uprising, Hamas (an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement) emerged from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the secular, nationalist PLO, Hamas framed the conflict in Islamic terms and aimed to liberate all of Palestine through jihad. Hamas initially gained support through a network of charitable social services in Gaza – running schools, clinics, and aid programs – as well as through its commitment to armed resistance. It quickly built a militia (the al-Qassam Brigades) and carried out attacks, including the first suicide bombings in the 1990s. Hamas rejected the idea of permanent peace with Israel, refusing to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Its 1988 charter called for reclaiming every inch of Palestine as an Islamic waqf (endowment) and included anti-Jewish rhetoric.

The Intifada invigorated the Palestinian quest for self-determination and underscored to Israel (and the world) that millions of Palestinians would not remain indefinitely under occupation without resisting. It also had the effect of pushing the Israeli government and the PLO toward negotiations. The PLO’s decision in 1988 to accept a two-state solution was partly a result of the Intifada demonstrating Palestinian resolve. By the early 1990s, these shifts created an opening for diplomacy: an American-led peace process began with the 1991 Madrid Conference, which for the first time brought Israelis and Palestinians (as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation) to the same table. Although Hamas opposed these talks and was not part of the PLO (indeed, it was a rival), the stage was set for a historic compromise between the mainline Palestinian leadership and Israel.

The Oslo Accords and the Palestinian Authority (1993–2000)

In 1993, years of secret negotiations culminated in a breakthrough: the Oslo Accords. This was a series of agreements between Israel and the PLO that marked the first direct, mutual recognition between the two sides. Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, with US President Bill Clinton mediating, famously shook hands on the White House lawn in September 1993. In the Oslo I Accord (the Declaration of Principles), the PLO formally recognized the State of Israel, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people . Both sides agreed to a framework for resolving the conflict by peaceful means, envisioning a “two-state solution” – Israel and a future Palestine living side by side.

Under Oslo, a transitional Palestinian self-government was to be established in parts of the occupied territories for a five-year interim period, during which a final peace treaty would be negotiated. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created to administer Palestinian-populated areas. Arafat returned from exile to lead the PA, which gained control of major cities in the West Bank (like Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron) and the Gaza Strip . Israel withdrew its military from the centers of Palestinian cities (while retaining control of borders, airspace, and security overall). The Oslo II Accord in 1995 further detailed this, dividing the West Bank into Areas A (full Palestinian civil and security control), B (Palestinian civil control, Israeli security control), and C (full Israeli control). The idea was that this interim arrangement would build trust and be a stepping stone to an independent Palestinian state encompassing Gaza and most of the West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital, by 1999.

Oslo raised hopes for peace – Rabin and Arafat even jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize (with Israel’s FM Shimon Peres) – but it also faced significant opposition from hardliners on both sides. Hamas and other militant groups (like Islamic Jihad) denounced Oslo and sought to derail it; they launched suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in the mid-1990s . These attacks – on buses, in cafés, etc. – killed dozens of Israelis and undermined Israeli public support for the accords. Meanwhile, Israeli extremists also struck: in 1994, a far-right Israeli settler massacred 29 Palestinian worshipers in Hebron’s Ibrahimi Mosque. And tragically, in November 1995, an Israeli opponent of Oslo assassinated Prime Minister Rabin at a peace rally. Rabin’s death was a major blow to the peace process; he was succeeded by Shimon Peres and then, after the 1996 elections, by Benjamin Netanyahu, who was a skeptic of Oslo. Netanyahu slowed implementation and expanded settlements.

By 2000, the Oslo process had stalled. The difficult “final status” issues – borders, Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and security arrangements – remained unresolved and were repeatedly postponed. Trust had eroded: Palestinians saw continued Israeli settlement construction (the number of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem actually doubled during the Oslo years) as evidence of Israeli bad faith, while Israelis saw continued terrorist attacks as evidence of Palestinian bad faith. Frustration mounted among ordinary Palestinians that freedom had not materialized – they were still under occupation, just with a Palestinian Authority managing civic affairs in fragmented enclaves. In the summer of 2000, US President Clinton convened a high-stakes summit at Camp David between Israeli PM Ehud Barak and Arafat to try to hammer out a final peace deal. They made some progress but ultimately failed to reach an agreement on the core issues (each side later blamed the other for the failure). The void left by this diplomatic collapse would soon be filled by violence.

The Second Intifada and the Gaza Disengagement (2000–2007)

In late September 2000, a provocative visit by Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem – a site holy to both Jews and Muslims – touched off large Palestinian protests. These protests escalated into the Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This uprising was far more violent than the first. It began as a series of protests and riots, but after Israeli forces responded with lethal force, it quickly militarized. Palestinian factions (including Fatah’s Tanzim and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad) carried out shootings and suicide bombings deep inside Israel – in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and other cities – targeting buses, nightclubs, pizzerias and more . Israel, for its part, deployed tanks and attack helicopters, and later even fighter jets, to combat the uprising, reoccupying many areas that had been handed to the PA. The death toll was much higher than the first Intifada: Over roughly five years (2000–2005), about 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis were killed, including many civilians on both sides . Particularly traumatic were events like the bloody battle in Jenin in 2002, and horrific bombings like those at a Netanya Passover Seder in 2002 (which killed 30 Israelis) and the response, “Operation Defensive Shield,” where Israeli forces swept into West Bank cities.

Arafat’s Palestinian Authority struggled to maintain control amid the chaos; Israel confined Arafat to his Ramallah headquarters for the last two years of his life. Terror attacks made Israelis fearful and angry; military crackdowns made Palestinians even more resentful and desperate. In an attempt to stop suicide bombers, Israel began constructing a massive separation barrier (wall) in 2002, cutting through the West Bank – it did significantly reduce attacks, but also annexed de facto some Palestinian land and imposed further hardship on Palestinians’ movement. The second Intifada finally wound down around 2004–2005, with fatigue on both sides and diplomatic intervention (the Road Map for Peace proposed by the US, EU, UN, and Russia). Yasser Arafat died in 2004 (some say of natural causes, others suspect poisoning) and was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian leader, someone seen as more moderate and opposed to armed uprising.

In Israel, Ariel Sharon – once a hardliner – had become Prime Minister and by 2004 decided to undertake a unilateral “Disengagement” from the Gaza Strip. The thinking was that Israel had no partner for peace after the Intifada, so it would withdraw from some areas to reduce friction. In August 2005, Israel evacuated all 21 Israeli settlements in Gaza, pulling out around 8,000 settlers and all its soldiers, and also dismantled four small settlements in the northern West Bank. This ended Israel’s direct military presence in Gaza . The move was controversial in Israel (Sharon had to overcome opposition from the settler movement and within his Likud party) but was completed by September 2005. Palestinians in Gaza rejoiced at the end of direct occupation, but the aftermath was complex: Gaza was left without a sovereign – the Palestinian Authority nominally took over, but Israel retained control of Gaza’s airspace, coastal waters, and most of its border crossings (except Rafah, which Egypt controlled under an agreement). Effectively, Gaza became a sealed enclave: free of Israeli settlements, yet not free to fully connect with the outside world. Israel soon imposed restrictions on movement, citing security concerns (especially after militant rocket fire continued). Many Gazans hoped the disengagement would be a step toward independence, but the continuing blockade fed a sense that Gaza was still under Israeli occupation by other means .

While the Second Intifada raged, the seeds of Palestinian political split were being sown. In 2003, Mahmoud Abbas briefly served as PA Prime Minister under international pressure for reform, but he resigned after clashing with Arafat. After Arafat’s death, Abbas won the January 2005 election to succeed him as PA President, pledging nonviolence and a return to negotiations. Hamas, which had sat out the 1996 elections, decided to participate in politics and leverage its popularity from fighting Israel and providing social services.

The Rise of Hamas and the Split between Gaza and the West Bank

Hamas’s rise to power came through the ballot box in 2006, surprising the world. In January 2006, the Palestinian Authority held legislative elections (under international observation). Hamas, running under the name “Change and Reform,” campaigned against the corruption and ineffectiveness perceived in the long-ruling Fatah party. To the astonishment of many, Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council – securing 74 out of 132 seats, while Fatah won just 45. This democratic victory for Hamas (widely seen as free and fair) posed a dilemma: Hamas was still committed to Israel’s destruction and had an armed wing; how would the world and Israel deal with a Hamas-led Palestinian government?

The answer came swiftly: Israel, the United States, and the European Union (which had been the PA’s primary financial donors) all refused to deal with Hamas unless it renounced violence, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and accepted previous agreements . When Hamas did not comply, the PA’s external funding was largely frozen and sanctions were imposed. Tensions grew between Hamas and Fatah. Attempts at a unity government failed. Violence eventually broke out between the two factions, most acutely in the Gaza Strip where Hamas’s power base was. In June 2007, after a week of intense factional fighting (in which dozens were killed), Hamas fighters took control of Gaza by force, ousting the Fatah-loyal security forces and PA officials . Gaza effectively came under Hamas rule, while the Fatah-led PA retained control over parts of the West Bank (with Abbas dismissing the Hamas-led government and appointing an emergency cabinet in the West Bank).

This political split that began in 2007 remains to this day: there is a Hamas-run Gaza and a Fatah/PA-run West Bank. It was a devastating division for the Palestinian national movement. The international community (US, EU, etc.) backed Abbas and the PA in the West Bank, and continued to isolate Hamas in Gaza. Israel and Egypt responded to the Hamas takeover by sealing Gaza’s borders even tighter, implementing a stringent blockade on Gaza. Virtually all exports were banned; imports and movement of people were heavily restricted. Gaza’s 2 million residents found themselves extremely isolated – a situation that only added to their hardship but which Israel argued was necessary to contain Hamas and prevent arms smuggling. Hamas, though shunned diplomatically, solidified its control internally, ruling Gaza and building up its arsenal (including rockets and mortars to fire at Israeli towns). The group also benefitted from support by countries like Iran (financial aid and weapons) and a lifeline of tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border that circumvented some of the blockade.

It should be noted that Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, the European Union, and many other countries . Hamas itself frames its fight as resistance against occupation. Over the years, Hamas’s rule in Gaza has been marked by periodic escalations with Israel, while the West Bank under Abbas has seen relative cooperation with Israel (especially on security matters) alongside sporadic unrest. The Palestinian split also meant that peace negotiations (like the US-sponsored Annapolis Conference in 2007–08) only involved the West Bank leadership; Hamas was not at the table and rejected any deals Abbas might strike.

Repeated Gaza Wars (2008–2021)

Gaza under Hamas became the locus of repeated conflicts with Israel. Starting in 2008, a pattern emerged: Hamas and other militant groups would fire rockets or missiles into southern Israel, Israel would respond with massive airstrikes and often ground incursions, fighting would rage for days or weeks, until a ceasefire was brokered (usually by Egypt, sometimes with US involvement). Each round left Gaza more battered and its civilian population suffering, while Israelis in border areas endured trauma and disruption. Key conflicts include:

• 2008–2009 (Operation Cast Lead): After Hamas declared an end to a tenuous ceasefire and increased rocket fire in late 2008, Israel launched a major military offensive in Gaza in December 2008. This three-week war caused extensive destruction in Gaza. Around 1,300 Palestinians were killed (including hundreds of civilians), along with 13 Israeli deaths . Images of devastated neighborhoods and reports of high civilian casualties (e.g., over 200 schools and UN facilities were damaged) garnered international criticism. A subsequent UN investigation (the Goldstone Report) accused both Israel and Hamas of possible war crimes . Hamas’s rocket arsenal was dented but not eliminated. A ceasefire in January 2009 ended the fighting, with Hamas battered but still in control of Gaza.
  

• November 2012 (Operation Pillar of Defense): Tensions flared again with exchanges of fire, and Israel assassinated Hamas’s military chief, Ahmed Jabari. Hamas and Islamic Jihad fired rockets that, for the first time, reached the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, thanks to longer-range missiles. After eight days of intense Israeli airstrikes and Gaza rocket fire (which killed around 170 Palestinians and 6 Israelis), Egypt brokered a ceasefire. This round was shorter, partly due to the new factor of Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system, which intercepted many rockets, reducing Israeli civilian casualties. The 2012 clash solidified Hamas’s political standing somewhat (as they claimed victory for withstanding Israel), but Gaza’s population paid a price in lives lost and trauma.
  

• 2014 (Operation Protective Edge): This was the longest and deadliest of the Gaza wars up to that point. Triggered by the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens by a Hamas-linked cell in the West Bank and subsequent tit-for-tat escalations, full conflict erupted in July 2014. Over 51 days, Israel conducted thousands of airstrikes and a ground invasion aimed at destroying Hamas’s network of cross-border tunnels (which Hamas had dug to infiltrate fighters into Israel) . Militants in Gaza fired over 4,000 rockets. The fighting was brutal: 2,200+ Palestinians were killed, the majority civilians, according to the UN, and approximately 73 Israelis (67 soldiers and 6 civilians) were killed . Entire areas of Gaza, like Shuja’iyya and parts of Beit Hanoun, were flattened by shelling. Civilians had few places to hide in the densely populated strip. The war displaced about a quarter of Gaza’s population and left infrastructure in shambles. International outrage peaked with incidents like the shelling of UN shelters. A UN commission later highlighted the disproportionate impact on Gaza’s civilians. On the Israeli side, life in towns near Gaza was paralyzed by constant rocket sirens and the fear of tunnel attacks. A ceasefire mediated by Egypt in late August 2014 finally halted the violence. Gaza’s reconstruction after 2014 was slow and impeded by the blockade and donor fatigue – by the time rebuilding had barely begun, another flare-up would occur.
  

• 2018–2019 (Gaza border protests and skirmishes): In 2018, Gazans launched the Great March of Return, a series of weekly mass protests at the Israeli fence, demanding the right to return to ancestral lands and an end to the blockade. These demonstrations, which were largely civilian (though Hamas endorsed them), saw protesters approach the fence, sometimes throwing stones or Molotovs. Israeli snipers deployed at the border caused heavy casualties – over 170 Palestinians were killed and thousands wounded over several months . The high casualty rate drew criticism of Israel’s rules of engagement. Hamas occasionally responded to incidents with rocket fire, and Israel with brief airstrikes, but these did not escalate into full war. By late 2019, a sort of uneasy calm set in, aided by Qatar providing some cash relief in Gaza with Israeli assent.
  

• May 2021 War (11-Day Conflict): Another war erupted in May 2021. Tensions had been soaring in Jerusalem – Palestinian protests against the planned evictions of families in Sheikh Jarrah (East Jerusalem) and Israeli police clashes with worshipers at Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan provided the spark . Hamas issued an ultimatum for Israel to withdraw security forces from the Al-Aqsa compound; when it went unheeded, on May 10, Hamas fired rockets toward Jerusalem. Israel retaliated with massive airstrikes on Gaza. For 11 days, fierce fighting ensued. Gaza militants launched over 4,000 rockets (overwhelmingly intercepted by Iron Dome or landing in open areas, though a few struck cities causing casualties), while Israel pummeled Gaza from air and artillery. Iconic towers in Gaza City collapsed after targeted strikes (Israel accused them of housing Hamas assets, though they also contained media offices and apartments). In Israel, regular life halted in the south and Tel Aviv area during barrages. By the time Egypt negotiated a truce, around 260 Palestinians in Gaza (including over 60 children) had been killed and 13 people in Israel (including 2 children) were dead . The 2021 conflict again wreaked destruction on Gaza’s already fragile infrastructure, including roads, the only COVID-19 testing lab, and thousands of homes. However, politically Hamas claimed it had “defended Jerusalem,” boosting its standing among Palestinians (even in the West Bank, where Abbas’s PA looked impotent during the crisis).

Each of these conflicts underscores a tragic pattern: Gaza’s civilians bear the brunt of repeated wars, with high casualties and worsening humanitarian conditions after each round, while Israeli civilians live under the intermittent threat of rockets and raids. International actors frequently intervene to stop the fighting – for instance, Egypt, Qatar, and the UN have mediated truces and arranged humanitarian aid. Yet the root causes remain unaddressed: Israel’s blockade of Gaza (imposed since 2007) and Hamas’s refusal to renounce armed struggle or recognize Israel, alongside the broader unresolved Israeli-Palestinian issue. As of 2021, Gaza’s economy was in ruins, with unemployment around 50% (even higher for youth) and basic services strained. The UN had warned that Gaza could become “unlivable.” Israel, for its part, maintained that its measures – the blockade and military operations – were necessary to protect its citizens from Hamas, which embedded its fighters and weapons in civilian areas, making warfare in Gaza inevitably devastating. Critics argue that collective punishment has been inflicted on Gaza’s population, who suffer for the actions of their rulers . This cycle set the stage for an even more dramatic and devastating confrontation that would erupt in 2023.

The 2023 Israel–Hamas War and Recent Developments (2023–2025)

On October 7, 2023, the conflict entered an unprecedented new phase. In a surprise attack on the last day of the Jewish High Holidays, Hamas launched a massive, coordinated assault on Israel from Gaza. In the early morning, thousands of rockets streaked into Israeli towns while Hamas commandos breached the Gaza perimeter fence using explosives, bulldozers, and paragliders. Hamas fighters poured into Israeli territory, attacking civilian communities (kibbutzim, a music festival, small towns) in southern Israel. The onslaught was shocking in its scale and brutality: Over 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in a single day – men, women, children – many in their homes, and approximately 250 people (including soldiers and civilians of various nationalities) were taken hostage into Gaza . This was the deadliest attack Israel had ever suffered and revealed a staggering intelligence and security failure on Israel’s part, given its high-tech border defences were overwhelmed. The massacre sent shockwaves through Israeli society and indeed the world, given the graphic nature of the violence (entire families slain, horrific atrocities reported).

Israel’s response was swift and decisive: the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally declared war on Hamas (a first since 1973) and vowed to destroy the group. The Israeli military (IDF) mobilized hundreds of thousands of reservists and launched an immense bombing campaign against targets in Gaza. What followed was weeks of intense warfare. Israel’s stated objectives were to eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities, dismantle its governance in Gaza, and secure the release of hostages. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, meanwhile, continued to fire barrages of rockets daily, reaching as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem at times, sending millions of Israelis repeatedly into bomb shelters (though the Iron Dome defense system intercepted the vast majority of projectiles).

Inside Gaza, the impact was catastrophic. Israel’s air force struck tens of thousands of sites, claiming Hamas command centers, weapon depots, tunnel shafts, and leaders were the targets. But Gaza’s dense urban fabric meant civilian casualties skyrocketed. By the end of the first month, international observers and Gaza health authorities reported over 10,000 Palestinians killed, and the toll kept climbing relentlessly. The strikes leveled entire neighborhoods (e.g. in Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, and later Khan Younis), turning them into lunar landscapes of rubble. Critical infrastructure was not spared: roads, bridges, hospitals, ambulances, UN shelters, water and power lines – all were hit, whether intentionally or as collateral damage. Israel imposed a total siege, cutting off electricity, food, fuel, and water to Gaza’s population in an effort to pressure Hamas . In response, UN officials described Gaza’s situation as “hell on earth”, with overburdened hospitals running out of supplies, and morgues overflowing. Civilians sought refuge wherever possible – over a million people fled their homes in northern Gaza after Israel ordered evacuations, crowding into UN schools or relatives’ homes in the south. At one point, an estimated 90% of Gaza’s population was displaced internally by the fighting – a scale of upheaval virtually unheard of in modern warfare.

In late October 2023, the IDF also launched a ground invasion into Gaza, sending tanks and troops into the northern part of the strip. Urban battles raged in places like Gaza City. Hamas fighters, entrenched in a vast network of tunnels (dubbed the “Gaza Metro”), put up fierce resistance. Casualties mounted on both sides, though exact figures for combatants were hard to verify. The war had a profound humanitarian toll: by early January 2024, nearly 23,000 Palestinians in Gaza had been reported killed (a number including many women and children, as well as Hamas fighters) . This already far exceeded the combined death toll of all previous Gaza wars. And the number kept rising – (by mid-2024, local authorities would claim over 40,000 killed in Gaza , although these later figures remain disputed). On the Israeli side, over 300 soldiers were killed in the Gaza fighting, in addition to the civilians slain on October 7. The hostages held by Hamas became a central issue – among them were children, elderly, and even foreign nationals. Hamas sought to trade them for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. The plight of the hostages galvanized Israeli public opinion and complicated military decisions.

Regionally, the war prompted fears of a wider escalation. Skirmishes flared on the Israel–Lebanon border, as the militant group Hezbollah (aligned with Iran and Hamas) fired rockets and anti-tank missiles at northern Israel, and Israel responded with strikes. In the occupied West Bank, the conflict stirred unrest: Israeli forces there carried out near-daily raids against suspected militants, and settler violence against Palestinian villagers surged. Over 200 West Bank Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire or settlers in 2023, making it the deadliest year there since the Second Intifada . However, the West Bank did not erupt in a full-scale uprising, partly due to the PA’s continued security coordination with Israel (a policy criticized by many Palestinians). Arab countries and international organizations repeatedly called for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds, as images of carnage in Gaza sparked mass protests worldwide. The United States, while supporting Israel’s right to respond to Hamas, also urged Israel to minimize civilian harm and later pressed for “humanitarian pauses”. The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for a humanitarian truce, but the US vetoed a binding Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in late 2023.

A breakthrough of sorts came in late November 2023: Qatar and Egypt brokered a temporary truce. For about a week, fighting paused as Hamas released 100+ Israeli and foreign hostages (mostly women and children) in small groups, and Israel simultaneously released 240 Palestinian prisoners (mostly women and minors) . This deal, welcomed by a war-weary public, also allowed in increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. But the pause was short-lived. In early December, hostilities resumed when disagreements arose on extending the truce and amid accusations from Israel that Hamas was stalling on further releases. The war raged on into 2024: Israeli forces pushed deeper into southern Gaza (having by then devastated much of the north), saying that Hamas leadership had fled south. Intensive battles were fought in Khan Younis and Rafah. As the months wore on, international pressure mounted on Israel to declare an endgame. By now, the sheer scale of Gaza’s devastation and civilian death toll had significantly eroded international sympathy that Israel initially had after the October 7 attack . Even Israel’s closest ally, the US, began to openly warn that the humanitarian costs were too high and that global support for Israel was waning .

Finally, after painstaking indirect negotiations, a full ceasefire agreement was reached on January 19, 2025 . This accord, mediated by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, involved Hamas releasing all remaining hostages (including Israeli soldiers) and Israel releasing a larger number of Palestinian prisoners. The truce also entailed Israel halting its military campaign in Gaza, effectively ending the war without outright “defeating” Hamas in a clear way. January 19, 2025, thus marked the official end of major combat operations. Israelis, while relieved to have hostages home, were left grappling with the trauma of the October 7 attack and asking hard questions of their leadership. In Gaza, people emerged into a landscape of apocalyptic destruction – entire neighborhoods erased, over a million made homeless, and countless families grieving. The power structure in Gaza was shaken: many Hamas commanders were killed (Israel claimed to have killed several top leaders, though Yahya Sinwar, the Gaza chief, was believed to have survived in hiding). What authority would govern Gaza post-war remained unclear; talk of returning PA governance or an international administration circulated but with no consensus.

It’s important to note that the ceasefire has been fragile. In March 2025, after some weeks of relative calm, violence erupted again: Israel accused Hamas of not fully complying with disarmament and of rearming during the truce, while Hamas accused Israel of not fully lifting the siege. A bombing in Israel attributed to a Gaza-based cell led Israel to resume airstrikes, shattering the ceasefire . Over 400 Palestinians were killed in a single day of strikes, indicating that despite declarations, the war had not definitively ended . This resurgence of fighting showed that the underlying conflict remained unresolved. As of early 2025, Gaza is in ruins and under a tenuous halt in fighting, the humanitarian crisis is beyond dire, and peace talks are nonexistent. The war of 2023–24 profoundly altered realities: it inflicted a wound from which Gaza will struggle to recover for decades and it has hardened attitudes on both sides. Israelis feel more insecure than ever, and Palestinians in Gaza have suffered an almost unfathomable trauma. The need for a political solution is ever more evident, yet mutual distrust and anger are at an apex.

Role of International Actors

The Israel–Palestine conflict has never been solely a local issue; it has drawn in numerous international actors whose roles have been pivotal at various stages:

• United States: The U.S. has been the most influential outside player in this conflict. In the early years (1940s–50s), US support was important for Israel’s founding, but it was somewhat balanced (the US also championed the UN partition plan which envisioned an Arab state). Over time – especially after the 1967 war – the U.S. became Israel’s primary ally, providing it with generous military aid (currently nearly $4 billion annually) and diplomatic protection. American weapons and technology have buttressed Israel’s military edge. Diplomatically, the U.S. has often acted as a peace broker (albeit seen as favoring Israel). American presidents convened key negotiations: Carter facilitated the 1978 Camp David Accords (leading to Egypt-Israel peace); Clinton mediated the 1993 Oslo Accord and the 2000 Camp David summit; George W. Bush floated the 2003 “Road Map”; Obama and Trump each proposed plans (though with little success).

  
  

  The U.S. stance has generally been to support a two-state solution. However, U.S. credibility as an honest broker has been questioned – for instance, the U.S. has repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel (especially regarding settlements or Gaza). American domestic politics, where support for Israel is strong across both major parties, plays a big role. Notably, in recent years, U.S. administrations have also pressed Palestinians to reform and clamp down on terror. In the 2023 war, the U.S. firmly backed Israel’s right to respond to Hamas and even deployed two aircraft carriers to the region to deter other adversaries from joining the fray. At the same time, Washington urged Israel to limit civilian harm and supported humanitarian pauses, ultimately helping broker the January 2025 ceasefire. The U.S. remains committed to Israel’s security, but also insists that Palestinian aspirations must be addressed to achieve lasting peace.
  

• United Nations: The UN has been involved since before Israel’s creation. It was a UN committee that recommended the 1947 partition plan to create Jewish and Arab states . After the 1948 war, the UN set up UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) in 1949 to care for Palestinian refugees – an agency that still provides education, healthcare, and food in Palestinian refugee camps across the Middle East . Over decades, the UN has passed numerous resolutions forming the legal framework of the conflict: General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948) affirmed refugees’ right to return or compensation; Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and recognition of all states (implicitly including Israel) ; Resolution 338 (1973) called for land-for-peace negotiations; Resolution 478 (1980) censured Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem; and many more. The UN Security Council often debates the conflict, but action is hamstrung by the U.S. veto. The General Assembly, where developing countries have a strong voice, has routinely condemned Israeli settlements and supported Palestinian statehood.

  In 2012, the GA voted to upgrade Palestine’s status to non-member observer state (implying recognition of a state of Palestine in the West Bank/Gaza) by an overwhelming majority. The UN also has special committees and a Middle East envoy monitoring the situation. UN peacekeepers have been stationed on Israel’s borders with Egypt and Syria at times (UNEF, UNDOF) to supervise ceasefires. The UN’s role is often to articulate international law: for example, it labels Israel’s settlements as illegal and has stated that Gaza remains “occupied” territory in legal terms because Israel controls its air/sea space and crossings . During conflicts like those in Gaza, UN institutions (UNRWA, OCHA, WHO) are vital for delivering humanitarian aid and documenting the impact on civilians. However, Israel has frequently criticized the UN as biased against it, citing the large number of resolutions focused on Israel. Palestinians, on the other hand, see the UN as a venue to internationalize their cause and seek legitimacy when bilateral talks fail.
  

• Egypt: Egypt has a unique and evolving role. From 1948 through the 1970s, Egypt was a frontline adversary of Israel – it fought in 1948, clashed in the 1956 Suez Crisis, and was decisively defeated in 1967 (losing Gaza and Sinai). Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt championed pan-Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause. However, after another war in 1973 (the Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt initially surprised Israel but ultimately a ceasefire left Israel in place), Egypt’s calculus shifted. President Anwar Sadat made a bold peace overture, culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize Israel and make peace, in return for Israel withdrawing from the entire Sinai Peninsula . This brought Egypt international favor (and billions in U.S. aid) but also ostracism from parts of the Arab world (and Sadat’s 1981 assassination by Islamists). Importantly, Egypt did not regain Gaza – the strip was left in limbo under Israeli occupation until 2005. In the decades since, Egypt (under Hosni Mubarak, then the current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) has often played mediator.
  

  With its intelligence services and diplomatic clout, Cairo has brokered virtually every major ceasefire between Israel and Hamas – in 2014, 2021, and 2023 for example. Egypt shares a border with Gaza at Rafah, and it controls whether that crossing opens (for people or goods). While Egypt expresses solidarity with Palestinians rhetorically, it views Hamas with suspicion, considering it an offshoot of the banned Muslim Brotherhood (which Egypt’s government sees as a terrorist threat to its own stability). Thus, Egypt cooperates with Israel in enforcing the blockade on Gaza from its side – tightly restricting movement and cracking down on smuggling tunnels – to weaken Hamas. During the 2023 war, Egypt struggled with the dilemma of possibly having to allow an exodus of Gazan refugees (which it strongly resisted, fearing that Israel might never allow them back and it would destabilize Sinai). Instead, Egypt kept Rafah mostly closed except for intermittent aid deliveries and evacuations of a limited number of wounded or dual-nationals. Broadly, Egypt sees itself as a guardian of Palestinian rights (hosting reconciliation talks between Palestinian factions and advocating for statehood in international forums) but also prioritizes its own security and stability. The Egypt-Israel peace remains a “cold peace” – formal and strategic, but without much popular warmth – yet it has endured, and Egypt’s role as intermediary is today indispensable.
  

• Iran: Iran became a major player from the 1980s onward. Before 1979, Iran (under the Shah) had friendly ties with Israel. But the Islamic Revolution of 1979 brought to power a vehemently anti-Israel regime, which broke relations and declared Israel (the “Zionist regime”) an enemy. Iran’s Islamist ideology and opposition to Western influence translated into staunch support for the Palestinian cause, albeit through a particular lens. Over the past few decades, Iran has been the principal patron of militant groups fighting Israel. It helped create and sponsor Hezbollah in Lebanon, which fought Israel in the 1980s, 90s, and 2006. In the Palestinian arena, Iran initially mainly backed Islamic Jihad, a small Gaza-based militant faction. After 2006, Iran also cultivated ties with Hamas – providing funding, weapons (like rockets and expertise to build them), and training to Hamas’s military wing. This support enabled Hamas to greatly expand its rocket range and build the tunnel networks that have vexed Israel. Iran’s motivations are partly ideological (commitment to “resistance” against Israel) and partly strategic, as it seeks to project power and influence in the Arab world and counter U.S./Israeli/Saudi influence. By empowering groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran gains leverage against Israel without engaging directly – a kind of proxy warfare. Israeli intelligence often points to Iran as the source of advanced munitions and technology (such as guidance systems or drones) that make their way to Gaza (often via Sudan/Sinai smuggling routes or by sea).
  

  Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force oversees these operations. The relationship hasn’t been without strains – Syria’s civil war put Hamas (Sunni Islamist) at odds with Iran’s ally Assad (Shia-aligned), leading to a temporary cooling – but military ties have endured. When conflicts erupt, Iran praises the “resistance” and threatens Israel; during the 2023 war, Iran warned of “regional consequences” if Israel didn’t cease attacking Gaza, raising fears it might directly or indirectly escalate matters (though Iran itself did not directly enter the fray beyond rhetoric and possibly encouraging Hezbollah). For Israel, Iran is viewed as its most dangerous foe, especially due to Iran’s nuclear program and its arming of Israel’s neighbors. This has led to an unusual alignment of Israel with some Arab states against Iran. In summary, Iran’s role has been to financially and militarily support Palestinian militant factions, making it a key factor in sustaining the conflict’s violent dimension and complicating peace efforts.
  

  Other Actors: Several other countries have had important roles:

• Jordan: Jordan controlled the West Bank from 1948–67 and granted Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians there. After losing the territory in 1967, Jordan eventually withdrew its claim and made peace with Israel in 1994. Today, Jordan’s population is majority Palestinian (either refugees or their descendants), and the kingdom has a vested interest in a fair resolution. Jordan is the custodian of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem (a role affirmed in its peace treaty with Israel), and it reacts strongly to any perceived Israeli encroachment there. Stability in the West Bank is crucial to Jordan’s own stability. The Jordanian monarchy often acts behind the scenes to urge progress on the two-state solution and coordinates with Israel and the PA on security and economic matters.
  

• Gulf States: Traditionally, countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have bankrolled the Palestinian cause (Saudi Arabia long gave financial aid to the PLO and later the PA; Qatar funds humanitarian projects in Gaza and provides political support to Hamas by hosting its leaders in Doha). However, in recent years, there’s been a shift: the Abraham Accords of 2020 saw the UAE and Bahrain (later Sudan and Morocco) normalize relations with Israel without a Palestinian peace deal, a departure from the old Arab League stance that peace with Israel comes only after Palestinian statehood. These Gulf states, tacitly aligned with Israel against Iran, decided to pursue their interests, much to the dismay of Palestinians who felt their leverage erode. Qatar remains an outlier, maintaining ties with Hamas and acting as a mediator (and financier paying for Gaza fuel and employee salaries, often with Israeli and US approval to maintain calm). Saudi Arabia had been in discussions to potentially normalize with Israel as well, but the 2023 Gaza war put that on hold, with Riyadh refocusing on demanding Israeli concessions to Palestinians again.
  

• European Union and Europe: The EU is collectively the largest donor to the Palestinians (funding the PA budget, UNRWA, and development projects). European countries have been part of the Quartet (with the US, UN, and Russia) guiding peace efforts. Europe generally supports a two-state solution and has been critical of Israeli settlement expansion. Some countries (like Sweden in 2014) have recognized the State of Palestine. At the same time, Europe has strong trade and scientific ties with Israel. European public opinion often sympathizes with the Palestinian plight, which can influence foreign policy debates. The United Kingdom holds historical responsibility as the former mandatory power; today it aligns closely with the US position, though public discourse in the UK is quite critical of aspects of Israeli policy.
  

• Russia and Others: The former Soviet Union was an early supporter of Israel (it voted for partition in 1947) but later became the patron of Arab states and the PLO during the Cold War. Moscow armed Syria, Egypt, and Iraq in the classic proxy dynamic against US-armed Israel. After the Cold War, Russia became co-sponsor of the Madrid peace process and keeps relations with all parties, including Hamas (which it does not classify as terrorist). Russia’s recent influence is seen in Syria (partnering with Iran and Hezbollah to keep Assad in power) and it has hosted talks between Palestinian factions. Other countries like Turkey have also played roles – Turkey under Erdoğan strongly champions Palestinian rights and often condemns Israel’s actions in Gaza, at times straining its ties with Israel (though they have improved recently). Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Turkey often work in different ways to mediate or reduce tensions.

In sum, the conflict is entwined with global politics. It has been a theater for superpower rivalry, a rallying cry for the Arab and Muslim world, and a test case for international law and human rights doctrines. These international actors can sometimes help de-escalate crises (as seen with ceasefires) or facilitate negotiations, but they can also entrench the conflict (through military aid or political cover). A lasting solution, if it comes, will likely require a concert of many nations supporting and guaranteeing whatever Israelis and Palestinians can agree to.

Humanitarian Situation and Current Status

After decades of conflict, the humanitarian situation – especially for Palestinians in the occupied territories – is extremely fragile and dire. The conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank deserve particular attention, as they illustrate the human toll of the unresolved conflict.

Gaza: The tiny Gaza Strip (about 365 km², roughly the size of Philadelphia) is home to around 2.1 million Palestinians, most of them descendants of 1948 refugees . Even before the latest war, Gaza was often described as an “open-air prison” . Following the Hamas takeover in 2007, Israel and Egypt imposed a land, air, and sea blockade on Gaza that has strictly limited the movement of people and goods in and out. For the past 15+ years, this blockade (periodically eased or tightened) has strangled Gaza’s economy. Exports are minimal; most residents cannot travel; electricity is rationed (usually only a few hours per day); clean water is scarce (over 95% of Gaza’s water is undrinkable due to salinity or sewage); and medical supplies are insufficient (patients often need special permits to get treatment outside). Unemployment in Gaza has been among the highest in the world – in 2021 it was about 47% (and a staggering 64% among youth) . Two-thirds of Gazans are under age 25, and many have known no life outside this confined enclave. Human rights groups have criticized the blockade as collective punishment of civilians , while Israel insists it’s a security necessity as long as Hamas is in power and smuggling of weapons is a threat.

The repeated wars in Gaza compounded these hardships. Physical destruction from bombings has never fully been repaired before the next round hits. Essential infrastructure – power plants, sewage treatment, hospitals, schools – has been degraded. For instance, the lone power plant in Gaza often runs out of fuel, leaving residents in the dark. By 2020, the UN assessed that Gaza was nearing “unlivable” conditions absent significant change. People’s coping mechanisms were exhausted: many families depended on UNRWA food aid; the youth faced despair, some attempting dangerous sea voyages to escape.

Then came the 2023–2024 war, which took an already dire situation and made it catastrophic. The scale of death and destruction far eclipsed previous rounds. According to Gaza health authorities (the Hamas-run Ministry of Health), by March 2025 at least 48,000 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed and over 100,000 injured since the war’s start – figures that, if even partially verified, indicate a human tragedy of immense proportions. (These numbers are much higher than independent estimates and may be revised, but even more conservative tallies in early 2024 were above 20,000 killed , which is staggering on its own.) The war displaced virtually everyone: 1.9 million Gazans – about 90% of the population – were at one point internally displaced during the fighting . Many ended up sheltering in southern Gaza in desperate conditions, as Israeli forces gradually pushed them into an ever smaller area. Entire families were wiped out in airstrikes; the dead could not even be buried properly in some cases due to constant shelling. By war’s end, whole districts lay in ruins. The cost to rebuild Gaza was estimated in the tens of billions of dollars – and that assumes materials can even get in under the blockade, and that stability and governance issues are sorted.

As of early 2025, Gaza’s humanitarian situation is beyond emergency – it’s apocalyptic. Food insecurity is almost universal; the UN World Food Programme and others report that the vast majority of Gazans are relying on food aid or going hungry . Medical care has been devastated: several hospitals were bombed during the war, dozens of doctors and healthcare workers were killed, and there are severe shortages of medicines and equipment. Diseases loom due to collapsed water/sanitation systems (clean water is extremely scarce, raising risk of cholera and other outbreaks). The education system is in shambles with many schools destroyed or used as shelters. Over a million people remain displaced, many living in tent camps amid rubble. Psychological trauma is immense – countless children exhibit signs of PTSD after witnessing horrors and living through bombardment. Gaza’s people are extraordinarily resilient, but the question in 2025 is: how can they recover? Without a lifting of the blockade and massive international aid, Gaza’s future is incredibly bleak. Rebuilding even basic housing could take years. Moreover, if the ceasefire does not hold and conflict resumes, the suffering would only multiply.

For Israel, Gaza also poses a humanitarian challenge on their side: the communities around Gaza suffered terrible atrocities on Oct 7, and then many were evacuated for months due to the fighting. Rehabilitating these communities (both physically and emotionally) is another facet of the post-war situation. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis were internally displaced during the war from the south and north (due to Hezbollah skirmishes) – though most have since returned after the ceasefire.

West Bank (including East Jerusalem): In the West Bank, the humanitarian situation is different from Gaza – less acute in terms of conflict destruction, but characterized by the grinding constraints of a 56-year military occupation. About 3 million Palestinians live in the West Bank (this includes East Jerusalem). Since 1967, Israel has administered the area with a system of military law (Palestinians are not Israeli citizens and generally cannot vote in Israeli elections, yet Israel controls key aspects of their lives). The Oslo Accords gave the Palestinian Authority limited self-rule in about 40% of the West Bank (Areas A and B), where it manages services like health and education for most of the Palestinian population. However, Area C, which makes up roughly 60% of the land (and includes most of the agricultural land and resources), remains under full Israeli control.

Israel has used Area C to expand settlements – Israeli civilian communities built on occupied land, considered illegal under international law (Fourth Geneva Convention) . Since 1967, successive Israeli governments facilitated the construction of over 140 official settlements and over 100 unofficial outposts in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Today, more than 620,000 Israeli settlers live in these areas (approx. 400k in the West Bank and 220k in East Jerusalem) . The settlement enterprise has fragmented the West Bank: settlements, roads reserved for Israelis, military zones, and the separation barrier (wall) together carve the territory into isolated Palestinian enclaves. Palestinian towns and villages are often hemmed in, with limited room to grow. Land confiscation for settlements or the wall has deprived Palestinian communities of farmland and water resources, impacting livelihoods.

Daily life in the West Bank is marked by restrictions and friction. Over 500 Israeli checkpoints, roadblocks, and other movement barriers exist across the West Bank, turning even short journeys into lengthy ordeals in some areas. Palestinians often need permits from Israel to travel between the West Bank and East Jerusalem or Israel proper, and these permits can be hard to get. The separation barrier, roughly following the Green Line but dipping inside the West Bank to encompass some settlements, cuts off many Palestinians from their fields or jobs. For example, villages like Bil’in found their land on the “Israeli side” of the wall, sparking protests. Human rights organizations report that Palestinian freedom of movement, access to health care, education, and economic opportunity are severely curtailed by these measures.

The economy of the West Bank has pockets of relative prosperity (Ramallah, for instance, has a growing middle class and even luxury malls) but also deep poverty in places, especially Area C communities that get little investment. Unemployment is lower than in Gaza (around 15-25%), but many Palestinians rely on jobs in Israel or the settlements (which pay higher wages but are politically contentious). Israel at times withholds Palestinian tax revenues (collected on the PA’s behalf) as pressure, impacting PA’s ability to pay salaries. The PA itself, while providing some stability, is plagued by its own issues of corruption and authoritarianism, which has disillusioned many Palestinians.

East Jerusalem deserves special mention: Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, and today about 350,000 Palestinians reside there as “permanent residents” of Israel (not full citizens). They face a precarious status – if they live outside the municipal borders for too long, they can lose their residency. Palestinian East Jerusalemites often deal with home demolitions (for lacking hard-to-get Israeli building permits), confiscations, and the encroachment of Israeli settlers in neighborhoods like Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah. Periodically, flashpoints like the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound ignite tensions – Israeli police actions or Jewish visits that Palestinians see as violating the status quo can trigger protests and violence.

Security and violence in the West Bank remains a constant concern. Israeli forces conduct frequent night raids in Palestinian towns to arrest suspected militants (especially since 2021, there has been an uptick in militant activity in areas like Jenin and Nablus by new groups like the “Lions’ Den”). These raids often result in armed clashes; in 2022 and 2023, Israeli raids killed militants but also many civilians, making those years the deadliest in the West Bank since the Intifada . At the same time, Israeli settlers, particularly ideological hardliners in the hills of the northern West Bank, have increasingly perpetrated attacks on Palestinian villagers – vandalizing property, uprooting olive trees, even shooting at villagers. Palestinians have dubbed this “settler terrorism” and accuse the Israeli army of often standing by or even colluding. In some cases, settlers form armed militias. The Israeli government elected in 2022 included settler leaders in key positions, emboldening the movement. For Palestinians, there is a sense of being under a dual onslaught: from soldiers and from unruly settlers. The year 2023 saw a few Palestinian shooting attacks on settlers as well (e.g., the killing of a family in the West Bank), which prompted revenge attacks such as the settler rampage in Huwara (where hundreds of settlers torched homes and cars in a Palestinian town). Such cycles contribute to a pervasive sense of insecurity.

Humanitarian organizations (like the Red Cross, UN OCHA, and various NGOs) provide relief in the West Bank too – for example, supporting communities whose homes are demolished or those in the Jordan Valley who face water scarcity because settlements and the Israeli water company control most water sources. Access to healthcare is also an issue; Palestinians often need Israeli permits to go to East Jerusalem hospitals, and delays can be dangerous for patients. Nonetheless, compared to Gaza, the West Bank has more economic connectivity and freedom of movement internally, and residents do not face aerial bombardment (barring a major escalation).

Refugees and diaspora: Beyond Gaza and the West Bank, about 5–6 million Palestinian refugees and their descendants live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and globally . In Lebanon and Syria, many still live in refugee camps and endure poverty and marginalization (e.g., Lebanon bars Palestinians from many professions and they largely cannot own property). These communities keep alive the hope or claim of the “Right of Return” to their ancestral lands in what is now Israel – a core issue in negotiations. Israel has consistently rejected a general right of return, saying it would end Israel’s Jewish majority. Refugee camps like Jabaliya in Gaza or Dheisheh in Bethlehem are potent symbols of the unresolved refugee question; some families have kept keys to homes they lost in 1948, passing them down as heirlooms of memory.

Looking at 2024–2025, the humanitarian needs across Palestinian areas are at an all-time high. The UN has appealed for billions in aid. There’s an urgent call for reconstruction in Gaza, but also a political push by some for ensuring the rebuilding doesn’t just entrench Hamas or the status quo – meaning possibly involving the PA or international supervision. In the West Bank, the priority is often protection: preventing forced evictions, settler violence, and ensuring access to resources. For Israelis, the humanitarian picture is markedly different – Israel is a developed country with a high standard of living for most, but the conflict imposes its own costs: psychological trauma (especially among communities near Gaza or in the north near Lebanon), and the perpetual burden of military service (most Israeli youths serve ~2–3 years in the IDF, many having to patrol West Bank checkpoints or Gaza’s perimeter, which can be morally and mentally taxing). Israeli families also periodically mourn those lost to wars or attacks. However, there is a vast asymmetry: Palestinians as an occupied, stateless people suffer far higher fatalities and systemic hardships.

In conclusion, the humanitarian situation underscores that the status quo is untenable. As of 2025, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank live in conditions ranging from challenging to outright catastrophic, with basic human rights under threat – be it freedom of movement, safety, housing, or self-determination. Israelis live in a recognized state with prosperity and military might, but lack long-term security or peace, as periodic conflicts and the recent trauma of mass casualty attacks demonstrate. The conflict’s persistence means more humanitarian crises will almost inevitably arise. Without a political resolution addressing core grievances – such as ending the occupation, ensuring security for Israel, establishing a viable Palestinian state, resolving Jerusalem’s status, and finding a just solution for refugees – humanitarian band-aids will continue to be applied to fresh wounds. History has shown that measures of separation (blockades, walls) may manage the conflict but also breed desperation that can explode in violence, whereas coexistence efforts remain stalled by mutual distrust.